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Doctors, patients and risk
Within the domain of best-practice medicine, the definition of a 
specific diagnosis is the first step in every clinical interaction. Therein 
is a gradation of specificity. Syndromic diagnosis, important as it is, 
is the most general. Rather than syndromes, doctors aim to diagnose 
specific disease. Progressively, research leads to genetic specificity 
and biochemical identity and ultimately to molecular definition 
of the fundamental disease or congenital abnormality that leads a 
patient to seek medical help.
The pathway to achieve such diagnostic specificity is a five-link 
chain, of which the generation of a differential diagnosis is the 
pivotal link. That chain comprises: taking a history, examining the 
patient, generating a differential diagnostic list, performing tests and 
investigations and, ultimately, making a definitive diagnosis.[1]
Genetic diseases comprise a significant component of clinical 
practice. The occurrence and even the severity of many non-genetic 
conditions (injuries are an extreme example) are also influenced by a 
person’s genetic makeup. For every person diagnosed with a genetic 
disease  in medical terms, the proband or index patient, there are 
potentially scores of first-, second- and third-degree relatives who may 
be enmeshed in consequences of a relative’s genetic diagnosis. Such also 
seek counsel about genetic risks of recurrence. From the patient’s point 
of view, it matters little whether or not a simple phenotypic diagnosis 
is made, or whether a disease can be defined in molecular terms. From 
the patient’s point of view, the two most fundamental questions that 
are sought are:
1. What is the risk of recurrence? 
2. If another child or family member develops the disease in question, 
what is the likely severity?[2]
The generation and transmission of such genetic risks comprise the 
end-point of the diagnostic chain. How patients interpret such risks 
has been the subject of much research.[3-6] This theme is not specific 
to genetically determined disease and is universal in all aspects of 
healthcare. It ranges from those contemplating the risks of surgery to 
how one balances costs against the threat of preventable disease. It is 
of no less importance to those who volunteer as subjects for medical 
research.[7]
Risks and their interpretation
Risks can be interpreted in many ways. Absolute risk is expressed 
in mathematical terms, and if the research to quantify risk is of 
high integrity, the mathematical risk is absolute. Risk is the threat 
or potential for harm, misadventure or unfortunate outcome with 
diverse consequences. Such potential is expressed in terms of 
probability. Probability is a complex psychological construct. It 
refers to the percentage of a featured outcome within a group as the 
end-point summary of repeated sequences or trials. As individuals, 
we transfer this concept of group probability to ourselves, and we 
impart the concept of probability to personal risk. Harm or the 
deleterious result of a single or specific ‘gamble’ is the outcome of 
realised risk.
Absolute risk is an inviolate mathematical truth. As individuals, 
we use this basic mathematical truth to construct a personal 
concept of risk, in any one of many different forms. Collectively, 
these comprise the subjective interpretation of risk.[3] Such 
internalisation of risk determines the way in which individuals 
respond to uncertain situations. It matters little whether that risk is 
imposed on an individual by external circumstances or whether an 
individual actively seeks out to partake in an action or endeavour 
with uncertain outcome.
Some imagine the concept of risk as a linear scale of probability 
and imagine themselves as occupying one point on that scale. My 
own research showed that such a scale is not a ratio or interval scale, 
but one with distortions along its extent.[5] Some use the concept of 
relative risk, a second order comparison, by introducing an unrelated 
scale of risk and placing the featured risk not in absolute terms, but 
as one relative to the unrelated risk. Others, perhaps 10 per cent of 
the population, regard risk as a binary concept – ‘either one will get 
the feature outcome or not, irrespective of the absolute mathematical 
risk involved’.[5]
The subjective interpretation of risk is a universal phenomenon. 
We act according to its dictates, rather than to any concept of 
Interpreting genetic risks
J Pearn, MD, PhD, DSc, FRACP, FRCP (Lond), FRCP (Edin), FRCPS (Glas), FLS
Emeritus Professor of Paediatrics and Genetics, Lady Cilento Children’s Hospital, South Brisbane, Australia, and Sometime Surgeon General, 
Australian Defence Force, Brisbane, Australia  
Corresponding author: J Pearn (j.pearn@uq.edu.au)
Prof. Peter Beighton has given a professional lifetime to helping patients and their families who have been afflicted by inherited disease. His 
clinical skills have brought certainty, confidence and support to those confronted with some of the most difficult decisions in life’s progress. 
Prof. Beighton’s research has led to the discovery of new syndromes and the elucidation of accurate genetic risks in many diseases. This in 
turn has empowered patients and their families to make informed decisions and has provided doctors with the scientific knowledge to help 
patients. On the occasion of this festschrift, I join with so many members of Peter’s international professional family to pay tribute to his 
leadership and service – not only in medical genetics – but also in the broadest domains of healthcare.
S Afr Med J 2016;106(6 Suppl 1):S87-S89. DOI:10.7196/SAMJ.2016.v106i6.11004
S88       June 2016, Vol. 106, No. 6 (Suppl 1)
THE NEW MILLENNIUM
absolute risk. It has long been known that professional statisticians 
and mathematicians, if clandestinely observed at a roulette table, 
do not gamble according to the mathematical risks with which 
they are confronted, but according to the imposts of subjective 
risk.[8-10] At roulette, such professional statisticians are more likely 
(greater than 50%) to gamble on a ‘red’ after a run of 10 or so 
‘blacks’, even though the mathematical probability remains 1 in 
2, or 50%. In absolute terms, ‘the die has no memory’, but in the 
pragmatic world of obligate decision-making, we are influenced 
as if it had. 
Helping patients to interpret risks that confront them is one facet 
of the art, as opposed to the science, not just of medicine but of all 
healthcare.
Absolute risk
The calculation of a patient’s risk of genetic recurrence is the 
domain of the attending clinician, with the help of geneticists and 
pathologists. Such include the specialty professions of cytogenetics, 
biochemistry and molecular biology. If one is calculating risks 
for a patient prior to the conception of a new infant, a range of 
techniques are available, including carrier detection studies. Such 
may also include issues of mosaicism, lyonisation and Bayesian 
statistics. With the advent of molecular biology and genome 
sequencing, much of the earlier (i.e. pre-1990) problems of complex 
biochemical analyses have been bypassed. If index patients have 
died, or if diagnostic samples are not available (either due to 
untraceability or refusal to supply specimens) the traditional use of 
Bayesian statistics may still have to be employed. Whatever are the 
difficulties, an absolute risk (or range of risk) can almost always be 
calculated.
This calculation of the absolute risk is the first step and 
forms the basis of genetic counselling. One role of the medical 
geneticist or genetic counsellor is to discuss the absolute risk, 
such that the patient’s subjective risk has pragmatic relevance 
to those who will bear its ultimate consequences if realised, or 
who will enjoy the outcome if not. The style of such counselling 
varies across the spectrum from relative non-directedness, 
through shared decision-making, to that of more directed 
recommendations.[6]
Subjective interpretation of risk
Decision-making is important in everyday life and almost always 
involves the interpretation and balancing of risks. Every decision 
in clinical medicine on the part (ultimately, independently) of both 
doctors and the patients whom they treat, depends on the subjective 
interpretation of what can be assessed or presented as objective or 
absolute risk.
Emotions, comprising both subjective and physiological com-
ponents, modify the way in which risk is subjectively interpreted. [11] 
Neural processing during risk analysis and risk-taking is associated 
with increased neuroimaging signals in the insula and anterior 
cingulate gyrus.[12] Different parts of the pre-frontal cortex are 
associated with cognitive focusing on objective risk. Different parts of 
the brain ‘light up’ under magnetic resonance imaging studies when 
risk-averse individuals are compared with risk-seeking individuals, at 
least in research undertaken to study risk behaviour in the context of 
financial decisions.[13]
It has long been known that there are at least six major 
determinants that influence the way in which objective risk is 
subjectively interpreted.[3] These include (i) the way in which risk 
figures are presented; (ii) the anticipation of the risk odds prior 
to receiving information on objective risk; (iii) the nature of the 
outcome if the risk eventuates, potentially causing hurt or harm; (iv) 
individual personality; (v) prior runs of good or bad luck; and (vi) 
time factors which determine whether a gamble has to be accepted 
with immediacy or can be deferred. 
Personality factors are of dominant importance in the way in which 
objective or absolute risk is interpreted and in the way decision-
making follows.[14] There exists a spectrum of such personalities, 
ranging from those who are higher risk-acceptors (sometimes 
courageous gamblers!) to those who are extremely risk-averse. A 
simple example was proposed by Dr Christopoulos and colleagues 
from Cambridge University: Consider somebody selling you a lottery 
ticket offering [a prize of] £40 or £60, depending on the flip of a 
coin. You decide to pay up to £50 to buy this ticket. Conversely, your 
friend might consider this ticket as risky and pay a maximum of £45. 
Although both of you face exactly the same average payoff, your 
reactions are different and vary between risk neutrality (you) and 
risk avoidance (your friend). Such decisions involving risky options 
characterise a wide spectrum of human and animal behaviour.[15]
The pessimistic person (‘just my bad luck!’) tends to increase 
his or her subjective view of risk. The optimist (‘it can’t happen 
to me’) believes that although they may be subject to what some 
would regard as a general risk, somehow their real personal risk is 
much less.
Runs of good and bad luck
If two successive children have been born affected by a 
polygenetically determined condition such as a neural tube defect 
or a cleft lip, the objective risks of recurrence for the next pregnancy 
are in the order of 1 in 8 to 1 in 10. My experience is that in many 
such cases, the ‘run’ of an unfortunate outcome may influence 
the parents subjectively to interpret their recurrence risk as more 
threatening than they otherwise would. Other examples have been 
recorded where a run of sequential pregnancies has each resulted in 
the birth of an infant with fatal infantile spinal muscular atrophy.[2] 
In this instance, although the recurrence risks for other pregnancies 
are fixed (autosomal recurrence risks of 1 in 4), parents distressed 
by this experience may not embark on another pregnancy, although 
the risk of a normal child is 75%. It has long been known that 
the psychological influence of a run of good or bad luck (run 
dependency) is strong.[8] 
There exist two common erroneous beliefs about randomness 
in any wager with a binary outcome. These are the ‘gambler’s 
fallacy’ and the ‘hot hand fallacy’. There exists a comprehensive 
corpus of research on each of these misconceptions, primarily in 
the psychological research literature relating to wagering practices. 
Nevertheless, I believe that such influences probably relate to all 
forms of risk-taking. 
Those influenced by the gambler’s fallacy act as if long outcome 
runs (black, black, black … black) modify the probability of a 
subsequent alternative (red) outcome. This is a powerful influence, 
especially (in the gambling context) in loss-chasing.[9]
The alternative influence, the ‘hot hand fallacy’, modifies decision-
making under binary randomness, and influences subjects to keep to 
a supposed winning streak.[10] 
In the domain of genetic counselling, if parents decide to embark 
on a pregnancy in the face of genetic risk, the outcome is thought 
by a significant proportion of individuals to be a binary one – either 
good (the birth of a normal infant) or unfavourable (if the index 
disease recurs). In the genetic context, it has long been known that 
sex differences in attitude to risk are well-known.[3] Males who are 
motivationally characterised risk-takers are generally dissatisfied 
when they adopt a conservative (risk-averse) strategy.[16]
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Pretest counselling
The results of any medical test can modify one’s life. Early 
(sometimes, pre-symptomatic) testing can detect disease states and 
effect cure. In contrast, test results in otherwise healthy individuals 
can result in the deleterious modification of life to no avail if a 
disease is untreatable. Presymptomatic testing for such conditions 
as Huntington’s chorea and Duchenne muscular dystrophy are 
extreme examples.
Another topical example is BRCA1 or BRCA2 genetic testing 
for women with a family history of breast cancer. The way in 
which women interpret the results of such genetic threat is highly 
variable. The majority (71%) of women who currently undergo 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing in the USA receive results that are either 
ambiguous or uninformatively negative.[17] The minority who receive 
straightforward positive or negative test results usually interpret these 
correctly. Nevertheless, between 2 and 8% of women misinterpret 
even straightforward results.[18] Those (the majority) who receive 
uninformative or ambiguous results were even less likely to interpret 
the significance of the results. Such interpretation requires considerable 
skills in numeracy – on behalf of both patients and counsellors.[18]
One implication of the extensive research on risk interpretation in 
the medical domain is that pre-test counselling is essential. This issue is 
topical, as do-it-yourself genetic testing is currently increasing; and can 
result in distress (not only in index patients but in extended members 
of the kindred) which is unfortunate, unnecessary and preventable.
It may seem obvious, but it is important to reinforce the fact 
that a risk of disease or disability is not the disease itself. This has 
been emphasised particularly in the context of cardiovascular risk 
calculators, where some ‘doctors try to manage risks as if they were 
the disease itself and, as a result, patients are subjected not only to 
undergo worry but also to the harmful side-effects of preventive 
medication and testing’.[7]
Relative risks
In addition to the constraints and influences above, the process of 
decision-making under risks includes two further themes. These are 
the concept of relative risk and a construct known in medical terms 
as the ‘number needed to treat’.[19]
In the context of relative risk, consider a couple in whose family 
cystic fibrosis has occurred. Prior to carrier detection testing, the risk 
of occurrence might be 1 in 4, 1 in 100 or the random population 
risk – in Western societies, 1 in 2 500. Depending on whether a 
patient thinks in decimal terms or percentages, a 1 in 2 risk can be 
expressed as 50%, 0.5, 1 in 2 or visually as a pie chart with half the 
circle shaded.[3,4]
The risk to a woman having a baby who has a niece with cystic 
fibrosis is in the order of 1 in 200; but the chance of any couple 
having a baby with a significant physical or mental abnormality is 
1 in 50 (2%). Such couples, who might have interpreted the 1 in 200 
as a high risk, subjectively see this as less threatening when the more 
general (but higher) absolute risk is seen in perspective. Relative 
risk is often referred to jokingly to self-mitigate a specific risk. One 
sometimes hears the phrase ‘well, the chance of being run down by 
a car is higher!’ 
The concept of relative risk is inescapable whenever one is 
prescribed medication. The risk of side-effects needs be balanced 
against the untreated primary disease. If one is speaking of preventive 
drugs or preventive treatment (e.g. statins to reduce the risk of heart 
attack), it is important that individuals should discuss with their 
doctor if the reduction in the absolute risk outweighs the risky side-
effects and costs of treatment. This in turn leads to the concept of 
‘numbers needed to treat’. The use of statins is again a case in point. 
Using the cardiovascular risk calculator of the American Heart 
Association, one notes that for every 100 subjects treated with statins 
to prevent heart attacks: (i) only four are spared by the use of statins; 
(ii) 85 are spared heart attacks even if they had not taken statins; and 
(iii) 11 are stricken by a heart attack in spite of having taken statins; 
and (iv) 5 have chronic muscle pain.[7]
One interpretation of the risks involved can take the path of 
deciding which of the above sub-groups affords the most ‘utility’ for 
the patient, as an individual.
Conclusion
Decision-making is of fundamental importance in everyday 
life, and particularly in the domains of personal and family 
healthcare. A significant proportion of the greater than six million 
articles published annually present data concerning risk and 
risk reduction. [20] The detailed understanding and a focus of the 
way in which medical decisions are made can lead to a distorted 
perspective of the end-point of such personal decisions. That 
end-point is an individual, often perplexed and sometimes fearful, 
divided between the goals of having healthy children or optimal 
health on the one hand, and the concern of life-modifying sequelae 
on the other. There is a genetic counsellor and decision-making 
advisor in every healthcare professional. Their sensitivity and skills 
occupy a place of special trust and great privilege in the lives of 
those who seek their counsel.
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